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Abstract 
On the 27 September 1977 Opposition leader, Dr David Tonkin, moved: 
That this House believes it is safe to mine and treat uranium in South Australia, rescinds its decision 
taken on 30 March 1977, and urges the Government to proceed with plans for the development and 
treatment of the State’s uranium sources as soon as possible (SAPD 1978, p.1,204). 
Enriching uranium was included in his vision for the treatment of the State’s uranium 
resources and, in this regard, he shared bipartisan ground with Rex Conner who, some 
years earlier as Minister for Minerals and Energy in the Whitlam Government, argued for 
constructing an enrichment plant in South Australia. Initially, Premier Don Dunstan 
supported uranium mining and enrichment but his change of tack presented Tonkin with 
an opportunity to unsettle an otherwise dominant Premier. The Advertiser and The News 
were solidly behind mining, while on the other side of the divide a public campaign 
joined with Labor’s left-wing to demand a moratorium on mining and enrichment 
activities. Debates over the virtues or otherwise of mining and enriching uranium are at 
the forefront of public debate today and  thus enticing us to revisit the passionate debates 
that took place in both Houses between 1977 together with Norm Foster’s decision in 
1982 to cross the floor to pass the Roxby Downs Indenture Bill. Foster’s move left a 
legacy of good fortune in train for Labor on the nuclear front. Had he remained ‘loyal’ to 
the party platform Tonkin would have campaigned at the 1982 State election with his 
trump card intact, namely attacking Labor’s uranium moratorium. Given the shift in 
community support in favour of Roxby going ahead, it is highly likely that Labor 
Opposition Leader, John Bannon, would have struggled to win the poll. The ignominy for 
Tonkin lies with his losing office after one only term. For Labor, the luck Foster’s move 
generated remains, oddly, a lasting legacy. The Rann Government enjoys the buoyancy 
offered by the creation of the largest uranium mine in the world and the jobs Tonkin so 




One thing Opposition leaders crave is an issue with which to browbeat the Government. 
During the two years leading up to the eclipse of the Dunstan government in 1979 the 
issue of whether or not South Australia should mine and export uranium, and go further 
by adding value to the resource via its enrichment, presented the Liberal Opposition 
leader, Dr David Tonkin, with just such an issue. Ironically, Tonkin lost his advantage 
when that other thing Opposition leaders crave, political luck, visited Labor leader, John 
Bannon, in the form of Labor MLC, Norm Foster’s decision to cross the floor and 
support Tonkin’s legislation to begin uranium mining at Roxby Downs. 
 
This paper chronicles the debates leading up to the election of the Tonkin Government 
in September 1979 and its eventual demise. Foster’s refusal to support the party line 
effectively neutralized this issue in the lead up to the 1982 election campaign because 
Bannon committed an incoming Labor Government to the legislation, albeit with the 
proviso that amendments were likely.  In the absence of his favoured issue on which to 
chastise Labor, Tonkin struggled and faced the ignominy of being one of the State’s few 
Premiers to be defeated at the polls after only one term in office. His vision of the mine 
as a catalyst for jobs and investment is now a reality underpinning the electoral fortunes 
of the Rann Government.  
 
The many debates in Parliament, and the extensive coverage of this issue in the media, 
occurred against the background of the Cold War. The arms race between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and various proxy wars through out the ‘third world’, made 
this a period when nuclear war implied the mutually assured destruction of both 
combatants (the popular acronym was MAD) and much of the world as well. The 
peaceful use of ‘the atom’ for nuclear power faced an uphill battle against understandable 
public fear over matters nuclear. A broad based campaign against nuclear power 
involving the ALP’s left wing, fringe left wing parties, environmental groups and, by the 
mid 1980s, the ‘Nuclear Disarmament Party,  made it difficult for supporters of uranium 
mining and nuclear power to prosecute their case. Moreover, revelations concerning the 
carelessness of British nuclear bomb testing at Maralinga, 1,200 kilometres north-west of 
Adelaide, during the 1950s added to a picture of public consternation. The State faced 
with increasing unemployment coupled with a real sense of the relative economic decline 
compared to other States and this acted as a counter weight to the anti-nuclear camp in 
terms of winning over public opinion.  
 
Rex Connor vision for ‘enriching’ South Australia  
Addressing the 1975 ALP State Convention, Rex Connor’s  vision for a uranium 
enrichment plant in South Australia met with a cool reception. Connor embodied the 
labourist tradition that doggedly defended unions, tariff protection and economic 
nationalism. Connor wanted to ‘buy back the farm’ which entailed raising a huge loan to 
buy out the foreign corporations and build industry infrastructure. He hoped to access the 
vast coffers of oil money flowing into the OPEC States but Treasury officials where 
skeptical of his methods. Nevertheless, he convinced Whitlam for a while with his plan to 
use a shadowy intermediary, Mr Triath Khemlani who, for a $100 million fee, promised 
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to raise $4 billion from among Arab sheiks.1  Connor persisted with this pursuit after 
Whitlam had withdrawn his support and, when the media became aware of the 
shenanigans, the so-called  ‘Loans Affair’, the demise of the Whitlam Government was 
imminent. Just prior to his death in 1977, Connor informed the weekly newspaper, The 
National Times, that the loans he sought included the development of an enrichment 
plant.2 Connor predicted that the price of uranium would rise to $100 per pound by 1980 
and that, by enriching it, the nation would quadruple its uranium resources. Indeed, he 
claimed it was the ‘biggest deal in Australia’s history’. He told Convention delegates that 
'the top of Spencer Gulf is the safest place in Australia in regards to marine and rocket 
attacks ... and was the best site for the plant both economically and strategically’ and that 
he was certain this would happen in the near future. 3  Dunstan, seconded a motion 
deferring the mining, treatment and export of uranium until future investigations were 
made a position that did not fully accord with the views of his Minister of Mines and 
Energy, Hugh Hudson, who tended to support development of the State’s uranium 
assets.4  
 
South Australian’s read and heard much about the Redcliff petro-chemical site 
planned for the upper Spencer Gulf and in June 1976 they learned, via a leak to the 
media, that enrichment was part of the plan. This seemed to sit uncomfortably with the 
Labor Party convention’s opposition to enrichment and, not surprisingly, opened the way 
for the Opposition to highlight vacillation and division within the Government. 
Muddying the waters for the Government somewhat was leaking of a report emanating 
from the Development Division of the Premier's Department recommending that the 
export of uranium should be ‘made subject to refining and enrichment in Australia'.  
Dunstan convened a press conference to explain that the report was not released due to 
pending environmental investigations and, whatever the outcome, any enrichment plant 
‘would be subject to conditions of Labor Party policy to guarantee the safety of uranium 
sales to customer countries.’5 He rejected suggestions that internal party and union 
opposition to uranium mining were driving his decision and made the point that 
decisions on the matter must await the Commonwealth’s Ranger Uranium Environment 
Inquiry chaired by Justice Fox. Clouding Dunstan’s picture, at least in the eyes of the 
Opposition and local media, was the fact that the Minister of Mines and Energy, Hugh 
Hudson, had toured abroad earlier in the year assessing the market for an enrichment 
plant. 
 
                                                
1 David Wroe, ‘How the loans scandal became an affair to remember’. The Age, January 1, 2005. The amount Connor, 
initially with Whitlam’s consent, represented about one sixteenth of national gross domestic produce or about $50m 
in today’s equivalent. 
2 Jost, J, ‘Rex Connor: a last testament on the loans affiars’, The National Times, 29 August – 3 September, 1977. 
3 Cited in Johns, K, ‘Uranium in South Australia: Politics and Reality’, 15th State History Conference, 27-28 May 2006 
 Adelaide, History Trust of South Australia. http://www.history.sa.gov.au/history/conference/R_Keith_Johns.pdf and  
The Australian, 16 June 1975 
4 Jaensch, D, ‘Political Chronicle, South Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and History ,  Vol 22,  no. 3, 1975, 
p. 113. 
5  Advertiser, 1 July, 1976. 
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When Parliament sat next in late July 1976, Tonkin moved, rather clumsily, to 
censure the Government for being ‘gravely irresponsible and contemptuous of public 
concern in promoting proposals for uranium enrichment at Redcliff without having first 
set up and independent public inquiry into the project and is therefore to be censured.’6  
Dunstan ridiculed the motion pointing out that the Fraser Government was close to 
tabling the findings of the Ranger Inquiry.7 However, the picture remained somewhat 
confused with Hugh Hudson displaying his knowledge of European interests in 
Australian uranium. He explained to the House that should Australia refuse uranium 
exports the Europeans would simply develop fast breeder reactors that reprocessed spent 
nuclear fuel rods and, thereby, produce more plutonium that could be used for nuclear 
weapons production. He also noted a conundrum still very pertinent today:  
I would like to believe that some ideal solution to the energy problem exists other than returning to 
a caveman state. Some have suggested that we should supply coal to Japan so that the country 
would not need more and more nuclear energy, but environmental problems arise from using coal, 
pollution and the emission of CO2, and so on. It is argued that, in the Japanese situation, the degree 
of air is already so intense that future coal-fired stations in that country are not possible…Certainly, 
the Japanese do not see their future in terms of using coal rather then nuclear energy.8 
One needs only add China and India to Hudson’s summary to see the contemporary 
resonance. Interestingly, he went on to ponder the contribution of coal burning to global 
warming saying,  ‘I believe it can be demonstrated that if the temperature of the earth 
rises by as much as one or two degrees, the ice caps will start to melt and cities such as 
Adelaide will turn out to be inappropriately located’.9 
 
Confusion reigns – 1977 and a ‘meaningless motion’ 
The news of Western Mining Company’s discovery of a copper, gold and uranium 
deposit at Roxby Downs acted as the backdrop to the Government’s decision to adopt a 
‘leave it in the ground’ attitude toward uranium mining.10 With the advantage of 
hindsight this was, arguably, the ‘beginning of the end’ of Dunstan’s domination of State 
politics as Labor’s equivocation on mining uranium presented Tonkin, and the local 
media, with an issue with which they could paint Dunstan as captive to radical elements 
within his Party.  As unemployment worsened, the sense of a Government prepared to 
deny job opportunities permeated public opinion. Premier Dunstan moved in the House 
of Assembly: 
That this House believes that it has not yet been demonstrated to its satisfaction that it is safe to 
provide uranium to a customer country and, unless and until it is so demonstrated, no mining or 
treatment of uranium should occur in South Australia.11 [My emphasis] 
He noted that there were ‘quite compelling economic reasons for considering that we 
ought to be supplying uranium to a customer country’ but he said a number of matters 
                                                
6 SAPD, 27 July, 1976, p. 188. 
7 SAPD, 27 July, 1976, p. 192. 
8 SAPD, 27 July, 1976, p. 197. 
9 SAPD, 27 July, 1976, p. 197 and Jaensch, D, ‘Political Chronicle, South Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History ,  Vol 23,  no. 3, 1976, p. 439. 
10 The evening newspaper, The News 30 March 1977, reported the Cabinet decision as a ‘rebuff’ to Hudson and a 
triumph for Mr Duncan.  
11 SAPD,  30 March, 1977, p  3037. 
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required further investigation before his government would lift the moratorium on 
uranium mining. In particular, questions of nuclear power plant operational safety, the  
transport of uranium and, most importantly,  means for disposing of high grade nuclear 
waste needed to be resolved before the Government would agree to uranium mining.12 
The problem with this argument, and its obvious moral concern over prospective 
customers waste disposal problems, is that it did not accord with Hudson’s assessment of 
European and British nuclear industry officials he’d interviewed on his recent tour. They 
were not concerned about the disposal of nuclear waste, but rather, terrorism and the 
‘possibility that someone would get hold of plutonium oxide…and manufacture some 
kind of nuclear device and hold communities to ransom.’13  
 
Tonkin said he found little fault with the motion but remained displeased due to its 
failure to cystalise ‘any one point of view’. When speaking to the media on the steps of 
Parliament House he reiterated his view that Labor’s moratorium ‘demonstrated how far 
the ALP Left-wing was in total control of the Government’.14 The nub of his complaint 
concerned how the Parliament, and community for that matter, would interpret ‘to its 
satisfaction’ because, he argued, the ‘Premier has not given a firm indication of how it 
will be demonstrated to anyone’s satisfaction that it is safe to provide uranium to a 
customer country.’15 Interestingly,  he canvassed a host of alternative energy sources 
including ‘geo-thermal’ (so-called ‘hot rocks’) and sought to add to the motion that the 
Government ‘should give the greatest possible financial support to research into solar 
energy and other alternatives energy sources as a matter of urgency.’16 Tonkin returned to 
the House a day later to say it was ‘meaningless’ motion because it preempted the tabling 
of the Ranger Inquiry’s report. 
 
The year closed with Premier Dunstan accusing Prime Minister Fraser of lying about a 
supposed meeting between senior SA Government officials and the British uranium 
enrichment company, Urenco.17 The Premier reiterated his Government’s commitment to 
the motion passed in March but Tonkin, with reports appearing in the media of other 
meetings between State government officials and uranium exploration companies, was 
keen to pressure the Government. Apparently a ‘German multinational company’ was 
exploring for uranium in the Adelaide Hills with the permission of Minster Hudson’s  
Department.18  Tonkin moved a no confidence motion in the Government: 
That this house condemn the South Australian Government for its deceit and hypocrisy in allowing 
exploration for uranium with a view to its future development by mining and enrichment, while 
publicly maintaining the Australian Labor Party stance of leaving it in the ground.19 
 
                                                
12 SAPD, 30 March 1977, p  3037. 
13 SAPD, 30 March 1977, p  3,041. 
14 SAPD, 30 March 1977, p  3,038 and The Advertiser, 1 April, 1977. 
15 SAPD, 30 March 1977, p  3,038. 
16 SAPD, 30 March 1977, p  3,038. 
17 The Advertiser, 25 November, 1977. 
18 The Advertiser 23 November 1977. 
19 SAPD 1 December 1977, p. 1,144. 
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Pointing to the fact that ALP Federal President, Bob Hawke, was in favour of uranium 
mining, Tonkin tried to paint a picture of Dunstan ‘holding double standards on the issue’ 
and the State Labor Party as ‘clearly split asunder’20. Dunstan’s memories, of which I 
will focus on shortly, suggest that doubt did pervade his thoughts. This is apparent in 
media reports, for no matter how hard the Government tried to convey the message of the 
moratorium, the Opposition were able to counter with taunts of division and confusion 
within ALP ranks.  
 
Dunstan’s overseas investigation and the uranium moratorium’s affirmation  
Throughout 1978 uranium featured in parliamentary debates and in the media. The case 
for mining grew stronger after the Ranger Inquiry recommended uranium exports and the 
Fraser Government committed to a series of safeguards.21 Prime Minister Fraser argued 
in the House of Representatives in August 1977 that Australia had an ‘obligation to 
supply energy to an energy deficient world’ and, if it were not for this obligation, it 
would not approve mining.22 He appointed Justice Fox as an ongoing advisor on the legal 
and technical matters associated with developing reliable safeguards and, with this, the 
national debate shifted toward favouring exports. After all, it was argued that the Ranger 
Inquiry was a Whitlam Government initiative and, with its final report placed in the arena 
of public debate, those who favoured mining began to assert themselves more forcefully. 
Tonkin moved a motion in September 1978 to rescind the March 1977 moratorium 
stressing that his earlier support rested on waiting for the Ranger Inquiry and with it 
clearly supporting uranium mining, he argued that no substantial case could be made for 
refusing to support the Roxby Downs development.23 He also honed in on the question as 
to what constituted being ‘satisfied’ in respect of appropriate development of safeguards. 
He endeavoured to embarrass Dunstan over an ABC interview given on television where 
Dunstan conceded the difficulty defining just what constituted ‘satisfaction’ in relation to 
safeguards surrounding the nuclear fuel cycle. Tonkin maintained that this revealed that 
Dunstan was never going to lift the moratorium and, as a consequence, the job prospects, 
which he said were akin to those enjoyed by Queenslanders involved in mining at Mt Isa, 
were denied to South Australians. Dunstan repudiated the ill motive attributed to him 
and, in a carefully articulated rebuttal, explained that his earlier support for uranium 
mining and enrichment was based upon him not being fully aware of the problems 
associated with waste disposal. He pointed out that initially he was in favour of supplying 
energy deficient Japan and had believed in economic benefits of an enrichment industry.  
However, on examination of the position about high level atomic wastes, the evidence was very 
clear, that there were then, as there were now, no safe proven methods of high level atomic wastes in 
use…there were no international arrangements which would provide adequately for the thousands of 
years of guarding and monitoring of disposed high level atomic wastes.’24 
                                                
20 SAPD 1 December 1977, p. 1,144. 
21 The Advertiser ran a front page article by its senior columnist, Stewart Cockburn, accusing the Government of 
suppressing a report by the State’s industrial development chief that outlined the case for an enrichment plant at the 
head of Spencer Gulf. The article also suggested the proposed gas centrifuge method for enrichment would eliminate 
environmental hazards. The Advertiser, 3 August 1978. 
22 Fraser cited in Holland, I. 2002. 'Waste Not Want Not? Australia and the Politics of High Level Nuclear Waste', 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 37 (2) p. 284. 
23 SAPD, 27 September 1978, p. 1204-05. 
24 SAPD 11 October 1978, p. 1,375. 
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In light of new scientific evidence he remained unconvinced by the Fraser Government’s 
belief that the vitrification of waste was a solution and doubted the capacity of 
governments to care adequately for such a deadly product given his experience ‘right 
here on our doorstep…dealing with atomic wastes’ from the Maralinga tests. 
 
This assessment was, however, at odds with his Minister for Mines, Hugh Hudson, who, 
as noted above, found that waste disposal had not been identified in his study tour as the 
main concern for the French and the British. It appears Dunstan harboured some nagging 
doubts about the moratorium and in January 1979, notwithstanding suffering from ill 
health, embarked on a journey through the European winter to investigate the state of 
play among nuclear power using countries. He recounted that it was a grueling journey 
through England, Sweden, France, Holland and West Germany. While he learned that 
some progress had been made in relation to disposing of high grade waste, ‘it was still 
impossible to assure South Australian’s that it was safe to provide uranium to customer 
countries, and the existing policy on uranium mining must stand’.25 
 
Accompanying him on this trip was the former Director of the Department of Mines,  
a consultant on enrichment studies, a mining consultant and the Head of the Policy 
Secretariat, Mr Guerin and his Press Secretary, Mr Rann. Rann, he  informed the House , 
‘has been a leading anti-nuclear campaigner for years… and is constantly in touch with 
people in the anti-nuclear movement’.26 Tiring of the Opposition’s constant taunts, 
Dunstan was keen to stress the group’s impartiality saying they could hardly be regarded 
as left-wing. Citing two recent British investigations of nuclear matters, the Flowers 
Commission, the Windscale Inquiry, and a U.S House of Representatives Committee 
report he said it was the group’s conclusion that there remained an absence of safe means 
for the disposal of waste.27 Running through Dunstan’s speeches and other Labor MP’s 
was constant moral questioning of  whether it was right to supply a resource knowing that 
it created a grave problem for which there was no convincing solution. While there is no 
reason to doubt the earnestness of Dunstan’s investigations, it appears that Labor case for 
the moratorium lacked objectivity.  
 
Tonkin, with strong support from The Advertiser, made some headway when pointing 
to contrary assessments presented by the Premier and Minister Hugh Hudson. While 
there is some uncertainty it appears that Dunstan’s ill health, and his knowledge that 
Peter Duncan was orchestrating a campaign against any finding that might show support 
for lifting the moratorium, wore him down. Months later the incoming Tonkin 
Government’s Minister of Mines and Energy, Roger Goldsworthy, discovered  reports by 
two members of the study tour that contradicted Dunstan’s report.  Goldsworthy accused 
Dunstan of having misled Parliament at the time by suggesting that there was unanimity 
and quoted from the reports a view that waste disposal issues were resolved.28 The 
                                                
25 Don Dunstan, Felicia: the political memoirs of Don Dunstan,  Melbourne, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 313. 
26 SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,363.  
27 SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,363 and 2,365. 
28 Goldsworthy cited the former Mines Department head and the consultant on enrichment matters as having both 
agreed to South Australia should proceed with uranium exports given that technical matters concerning waste 
disposal and ‘rigid international safeguard controls’ were now in place among prospective customer countries. 
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fairness of this accusation is difficult to determine but uncertainty surrounding, what in 
fact should constitute satisfactory safety levels, lies at the heart of Labor procrastination 
during the latter days of the ‘Dunstan Decade’. The image of his Government bowing to 
‘left wing pressure’ was now credible.  Dunstan later observed in his memoirs: 
 
Unfortunately, during my absence, some members of the Party, led by Peter Duncan, had organised 
meetings to get various bodies of the Party pre-committed against any change in policy which might 
be recommended out of my investigations, and stories about this had carefully been leaked to the 
press, which could only give support to the press campaign against the honest intention of my 
investigations. I read the riot act at the Party Executive and the Caucus about this.29 
 
The die was cast when The Advertiser said this represented a ‘resounding victory for the 
ALP’s anti-uranium forces.’30.  
 
David Tonkin promptly moved a motion of no confidence in the Government, his 
second such motion in 14 months, stressing the employment opportunities foregone at a 
time when State unemployment hovered around 10 percent:  
 
Using the Government’s own figures, the build-up of new employment possibilities could 
conservatively amount to 20,000 with the general impact on industry, transportation and community 
services amounting to employment benefits of many thousands more having an income or 
independent living based on a fully developed uranium production industry … The employment 
situation in South Australia is critical … it is the worse than the Australian average.31  
 
Tonkin drew an analogy between Roxby Downs’s future prospects and the 30,000 strong 
mining city at Mt Isa and the estimated 80,000 Queenslanders who depended on its 
mining activities.32 He singled out Dunstan for failing to prevail over the factional 
divisions within his government, ‘The Premier has been  placed in the  most difficult 
position by extremists within his own party…because of the victory of the faction led by 
the Attorney General’.33 For the Opposition, the Government was no longer ‘responsible’ 
and unable to ‘govern this State for the common good’, following the result of Dunstan’s 
failure to stand up to his Party’s left wing’.34  
 
Taking considerable umbrage at Tonkin’s assertion that his Government ‘has 
effectively condemned South Australia to a future of industrial stagnation and economic 
disaster’,  Dunstan endeavoured to clarify his opposition to uranium exports: 
 
The Leader of the Opposition supports those people in the community who say that, for commercial 
reasons, for the gaining of pelf, are prepared to dig up and sell uranium in circumstances where the 
danger to mankind is enormous, and where we can not only condemn mankind to global pollution 
                                                                                                                                            
Goldsworthy’s statement on the matter is compelling given that he quotes from two reports written by both men; 
however, Mike Rann, is quoted in the Advertiser expressing the view that Goldsworthy ‘ in no way undermined the 
mission’s findings’ and that questions concerning weapons proliferation was a concern for all members of the study 
group. SAPD, 30 October 1979 pp. 469-72 and The Advertiser, 31 October, 1979. 
29 Don Dunstan, Felicia: the political memoirs of Don Dunstan,  Melbourne, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 312-313. 
30 The Advertiser, 19 February, 1979. 
31 SAPD 6 February 1979, p 2,359 & 2,360. 
32 SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,360. 
33 SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,361. 
34 SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,361. 
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that will bring cancer or leukemia to vast numbers of people throughout the world but also provide 
part of the process which may lead to the complete and ultimate destruction of mankind through the 
indiscriminate use of plutonium without proper controls…and no member of this Government 
apologises for the fact that we do not believe that we should be part of that process and that we 
cannot be in the uranium industry until we can say that it is safe.35 
 
One constancy in debates over whether or not Australia should develop our uranium 
resources is the charge made by the pro-mining position that, if we fail, others will take 
up the demand; this was a point Tonkin was at pains to make. 
 
The plain and brutal fact truth of the matter is that the South Australian Government’s ban has made 
no difference at all to the total world uranium situation…we must face the reality that a Government 
ban on uranium in South Australia has not affected and will not in any way affect or influence the 
development or imposition of safeguards in other countries…The U-ban has served only to isolate 
us, and to prevent us from exerting the influence on safety and disposal requirements which could 
otherwise have brought to bear if were an important supplier of uranium to the world market.36 
 
Tonkin’s political realism would, in time prevail and be championed by both sides. 
Shortly after this debate Dunstan resigned due to ill health in early February 1979 and 
shortly after that a special ALP State Convention reaffirmed the moratorium. The die was 
cast with The Advertiser saying this represented a ‘resounding victory for the ALP’s anti-
uranium forces.’37 New Labor Premier, Des Corcoran, battled for six months with the 
perception of leading a Party opposed to creating significant job opportunities at a time of 
growing unemployment and in the months that followed he lost control of the debate. The 
Advertiser constantly pressured the Government and ran a four part series of investigative 
reports canvassing the gambit of issues confronting Parliament and this all served well 
the Opposition Leader’s prosecution of the matter.38 Corcoran called an early election 
believing that his slogan ‘Follow The Leader’ would triumph over a still divided Liberal 
Party; he was in error, as John Summers explains, 
The Liberal party's policy for the election centred on economic matters in mining policy. They 
charged that the Labor government had mismanaged the economy and had, by governmental 
intrusion into the private sector, destroyed the confidence of overseas investors in mining 
development in South Australia. A Liberal government, it was promised, 'would give top priority to 
the exploration and development of S.A.'s copper, uranium, gold, coal, iron, oil and gas deposits. 
Exploring and developing the enormous resources of Roxby Downs, as well as other resources 
would create thousands of jobs and bring in millions of dollars to S.A.39 
 
The Roxby indenture bill.  
A six per cent first preference swing saw Tonkin take office in mid-September 1979 and 
it was not long before his Minister of Mines and Energy, Goldsworthy, explained to 
Parliament that the incoming government had a clear mandate to encourage uranium 
                                                
35 SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,361 & 2,362. 
36 SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,360. 
37 The Advertiser, 19 February, 1979. 
38 Written by David English and John Doherty the series ran under the headline, ‘Uranium: For and Against’, The 
Advertiser, 23 to 26 April 1979 and Summers, J, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, ‘Australian Political 
Chronicle – South Australia’,  vol. 26, no. 1,  1980, p. 110.  
39 Summers, J, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, ‘Australian Political Chronicle – South Australia’,  vol. 
26, no. 1,  1980, p. 108. 
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mining through the State and, in particular, to approve the go ahead for the Roxby Downs 
mine.40 For the incoming government a mining boom was the best hope to arrest South 
Australia from further falling behind other mainland States. The Fraser Government 
announced that it would relax the 75 per cent ownership requirement for new uranium 
projects to 51 per cent and, thereby, greatly increased interest in Roxby Downs. For its 
part the Labor Opposition, now led by John Bannon, joined with the United Trades and 
Labor Council and accused Tonkin of undue haste and being unwilling to deal with 
questions of nuclear waste disposal, workers' health and, moreover, was not taking into 
account falling international demand for uranium.41  
 
In February 1980, Goldsworthy informed Parliament that the Government would 
proceed with granting applications for mining at Roxby Downs and stressed that the 
royalties would see a reduction in State taxes and the creation of up to 5,000 jobs. He was 
keen to stress that all environmental impact studies would be undertaken and, likewise, 
codes of practice to protect miners and transport workers from radioactive wastes 
associated with mining would be enacted. Goldsworthy published a booklet  'SA's 
uranium resources - the government's decision' and  Bannon protested that this preempted 
the Upper House inquiry initiated by the Labor and Democrat MLCs. In the midst of this 
wrangling the Returned Services League formed the Atomic Veterans Association that 
claimed radiation had caused numerous health problems in the wake of a series of nuclear 
tests conducted by the British between 1952 and 1957. This issue gained considerable 
momentum with numerous reports in The Advertiser highlighting the extent of 
radioactive fall-out. Many believed radioactive fall-out had drifted over settled areas 
causing some Aborigines living adjacent to Maralinga to suffer blindness and death 
shortly after being enveloped in what they described as a 'black mist'.42  
 
In August 1980 Premier Tonkin released the Uranium Enrichment Committee’s report 
which canvassed a joint Government private sector plant, together with plans to grant 
licences to mine uranium at Honeymoon. During this period Goldsworthy continued 
talks with BP Australia and Western Mining on developing the Roxby deposit and 
visited Europe to study enrichment in the UK and Holland and the waste disposal issue 
in Sweden and France.43  On his return he said that there was ‘a strong consensus’ view 
that nuclear power would continue to develop for the rest of the century and, given that 
South Australian uranium was of ‘potential world significance’, there was clearly a 
‘moral as well as economic reasons why they must be developed.’44 Opposition leader, 
John Bannon, commented that the Minister’s assessment was unrealistic because there 
were no suitable technologies that could guarantee safe disposal of high-grade wastes.45  
                                                
40 Summers, J, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, ‘Australian Political Chronicle – South Australia’,  vol. 
26, no. 3,  1980, p. 425. 
41 The Advertiser, 11, 13, 15, 16, 24 October 1979. 
 
42 The Advertiser, 10 March 1980 and Summers, J, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, ‘Australian Political 
Chronicle – South Australia’,  vol. 26, no. 3,  1980, p. 426. 
43 The Advertiser, 27 September, 1980. 
44 The Advertiser, 20 October, 1980. 
45 The Advertiser, 5 November, 1980 
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Work on the Roxby Downs indenture bill was slow and, throughout 1981, as the 
national economy slumped,  the Government struggled to keep this, its most important 
story, alive in the public eye. In June the Premier tried to buoy up sentiment when 
announcing a $0.5 million feasibility study on a uranium enrichment plant at Port Pirie 
but this, too would take time because its report was not due until late 1982 just prior to 
the State election.46  Minister Goldsworthy introduced the Roxby Downs Indenture Bill 
to the Parliament on 5 March 1982 and postulated that it would become one of world’s 
largest uranium and copper mines. He explained that the joint partners, BP Australia and 
Western Mining, were committed to outlay $100 million for their feasibility study and, 
should the mine go ahead, he believed the joint partners would spend ‘well in excess of 
$1 billion, with 2,000 to 3,000 employed at the mine’ and a township of 9,000 would 
grow to support the mine.47  The Bill was complex with considerable detail surrounding 
the royalty and infrastructure arrangements and mine safety procedures.48 The likelihood 
of it passing the Upper House was uncertain with Labor and the Democrats arguing for a 
series of amendments that the Government, with the miners, refused to entertain.  
 
Bannon argued that the Government had persistently presented the public with a 
‘barrage of grossly inflated claims, and a crazy auction of predictions, particularly about 
employment and royalty income’ and concluded that this was so because  from the day 
of being elected Premier Tonkin’s only thinking on the State economy related to the 
development of the Roxby project.49 He questioned the need for the Indenture Bill prior 
to the resource evaluation being complete or any projected date for the commencement 
of mining. Most galling for Bannon was Tonkin’s ‘cynical and dishonest’ touting of 
employment likely to be generated which ‘immediately after the election had increased 
to about 50,000, both directly and indirectly’ but now ranged somewhere between 2,000 
to 3,000.50   He suspected the Government’s haste with the Bill, and its boasts for 
employment, derived from it having no other positive story to tell the people of South 
Australia. Deeming much of the Bill ‘vague and imprecise’ the Opposition reiterated the 
platform of its moratorium on uranium mining namely ‘that it is incumbent on any State 
or nation with responsibility which seeks to mine and sell uranium to be absolutely 
certain that it is safe to provide uranium to customer countries.’51 Concern focused on 
the perennial question of waste disposal but, also, on whether or not our prospective 
customers sought to reprocess spent fuel rods, a venture which might result in weapons 
proliferation. While prepared to support the companies in their pre-production 
assessments, Bannon called for a ‘Select Committee’ to examine leasing arrangements, 
radiological health issues relating to mining, special workers’ compensation provisions, 
                                                
46 The Australian Journal of Politics and History, John Summers, ‘Australian Political Chronicle – South Australia’,  
vol.  27, no.1 1981, p. 75.  
47 SAPD 4 March 1982, p, 3,338. 
48 SAPD 4 March 1982, p, 3,339-41. 
49 SAPD 23  March 1982, p, 3,407-8. 
50 SAPD 23  March 1982, p, 3,409 also see The Advertiser, 24 March 1982. 
51 SAPD 23  March 1982, p, 3,409. 
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clarification on the disposal of tailings together with a public inquiry into all these 
matters.52   
 
Decidedly unimpressed by the Opposition’s desire to stall the project, Western 
Mining’s Director, Hugh Morgan, said the partners would withdraw if the Bill was 
defeated, ‘we are not prepared to spend the additional money on a promise that 
somebody might review it at a latter date'.53 Public debate and protest by anti-nuclear 
groups intensified while the SA Chamber of Commerce and Industry, with thirteen 
other SA employer groups, conducted a campaign in support of the Bill taking out full 
page advertisements saying 'Roxby Downs must go ahead if SA is to remain on the 
map!'54 The prospect for the Bill passage through the Legislative Council looked 
unlikely with Labor and the Democrats opposed but at the June 1982 ALP State 
Convention the ground shifted under Labor MLC, Norman Foster and this produced 
some, as  Andrew Parkin observed, some  ‘delicious ironies’.55 
 
How Norm Foster MLC  ‘saved’ Labor 
 
With the Indenture Bill facing defeat in the Upper House, Premier Tonkin could look 
forward to the uranium issue being centre stage at the election due later in the year. Labor 
equivocations on nuclear matters had served him well in opposition and, with the 
recession tightening its grip, the idea of campaigning for jobs was something the 
Government relished. A member of the Legislative Council since 1973, the Labor Party’s 
Norm Foster was a forceful and independently minded character who informed 
Convention delegates that he would retire at the next election. An important point given 
what he was to convey in his speech. In recent times he fell out with his colleagues after 
some letters he wrote critical of the Party’s leadership team were leaked to the media. He 
was not in a happy mood and said; 
Uranium mining is a fact of life. Why should we want to send ourselves to political oblivion for 
another 10 years for our stand against it…I’ll be honest with this convention and say that I’ll be 
thinking hard and I’ll be under great trauma to cast a vote that is going to accidentally give an 
advantage in the near term, the next three to six months, to the Government. 56  
 
He opined that the uranium moratorium was tantamount to handing Tonkin victory ‘on a 
plate’ and told the Australian newspaper that some delegates, ‘had even congratulated 
him’.57 He noted that federal Labor had changed its policy to allow for both the phasing 
                                                
52 SAPD 23  March 1982, p, 3,408 and 3,410. 
53 The Advertiser 25 March, 1982 and Summers, J,  ‘Australian Political Chronicle – South Australia’, The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History,  vol. 28, no 3, 1982, p. 430. 
54 The Advertiser, 5 June 1982. 
55 Parkin, A, ‘Transition, Innovation, Consolidation, Readjustment: The Political History of South Australia Since 
1965’ in D. Jaensch (ed) The Flinders History of South Australia: Political History.  Adelaide, Wakefield Press, 
1987, p. 327. 
56 Foster quoted in The Australian, 14 June 1982. 
57 The Advertiser, 15 June 1982 and The Australian, 14 June, 1982. 
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out of uranium mining, while at the same time opening the way for the Roxby Mines. The 
so-called ‘three mines policy’ was illogical to any observer unaware of the dilemma 
Bannon confronted, namely, the moratorium had become electoral suicide.58 A few days 
later, in a rather long and rambling speech he presented a very mixed message to the 
Legislative Council on how he might vote on the Bill. He stated that he ‘had a pioneering 
attitude in the Labor Party’ for seeking to put an ‘individual view’ on a matter he’d 
‘thought profoundly’ about and for some time.59 His equivocation on the matter angered 
his colleagues who constantly interjected during the speech.  
 
Torn between supporting the Party line and doing what he thought was right for the 
State and, incidentally, electorally prudent for Labor, Foster walked into the mire of a 
campaign that brooked no dissent. In the rush to vilify and label him a traitor his 
colleagues appeared either appalled by his heretical disposition or, perhaps, governed by 
more Machiavellian considerations. Irritated by what he perceived to be wilful 
misinterpretation of his position and the perception that, ‘some members of my own 
Party did not in anyway, shape or form, in the Gallery and corridors of this place, accord 
me manners becoming to persons with normal and decent principles’, he shifted ground. 
He was upset by newspaper reports that said ‘bets were being taken, and placed on the 
marble mantelpiece in the Leader’s office about the way I would vote, when the Leader 
knew perfectly well how I would cast my vote last night’. On this latter point he told 
Parliament that he’d informed the Leader that it was not his intention to vote against 
Party policy.60 What drove Foster to end his ties with the Labor Party by supporting the 
Bill? Perhaps it was the threats to his family, which he was convinced came from within 
the Party, and were part of some sort of  ‘set up’?  The question arises in relation to his 
sensing a ‘set-up’ as it appears that the more pragmatic members of the Labor caucus 
purposely sought to irritate Foster into an act of disloyality. Labor shadow minister, 
John Cornwall, said in his memoirs that he played the role of ‘agent provocateur’;  
With John Bannon’s knowledge and support, we had resolved to goad Foster wherever possible. 
The plan was clever and cruel. Ostensibly our “anger” was because of our contempt for a colleague 
who was wavering…In fact, we had carefully calculated that the more public scorn and ridicule we 
heaped on Foster, the more we would reinforce the chance of his defection. We reasoned that it 




                                                
58 Parkin, A, ‘Transition, Innovation, Consolidation, Readjustment…’, p. 327. 
59 SAPD 17 June 1982, p. 4,719. 
60 Foster explained to the Council,  ‘Yesterday was a critical day, I informed the Leader of my Party, John Bannon, in 
his office of what I would do, so before I entered this debate I informed the Leader of my Party of what my intention 
was – that I would not vote awy from the Party line on this matter. I was, therefore, astounded last night when, 
during the debate, I was told by way of interjection by my colleagues – apparently, the Leader is indicating he did 
not know that…I was surprised and amazed that during the course of my speech last night interjections were made 
by members of my own Party to the effect that I was not wanted in Caucus. I was surprised because I thought that 
they knew my attitude’. SAPD, 17 June, 1982. 
61 Cornwall, J, Just for the Record: the political recollections of John Cornwall, Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 1989. p. 
25. 
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Thus, robbing Tonkin of a key electoral plank certainly entertained Labor MPs who, 
perhaps, felt their electoral fortunes were waning.62 As for Foster he stood by his party 
and opposed the Bill when it came to a vote and he promptly resigned from the party the 
next day. Tonkin blundered by not calling a snap election preferring instead to resubmit 
the Bill knowing that Foster, no longer a Labor Party member, would support its 
passage.  
 
On June the 18th 1982 the Indenture Bill passed the Legislative Council and five 
months later the Tonkin Government narrowly lost office. During the election campaign 
Bannon committed an incoming Labor Government to the Bill, but envisaged some 
amendments. His position was helped by the fact that Labor changed its national policy 
to support uranium exports, albeit restricted to a maximum of three mines.63 In early 
1983 the incoming Bannon Government committed to the development of the Roxby 
mine but noted that falling demand for uranium meant that there would be no open 
mandate for its mining in the State. Premier Bannon made this point in reply to 
Opposition Leader, John Olsen’s motion of no confidence over the Government’s 
refusal to grant a mining licence at the Honeymoon uranium deposit.64 The debate 
returned to similar themes with Labor committed to the moratorium but now working 
within ALP national policy which allowed for three uranium mines. The Liberal Party 
touted the jobs dimension and the loss of opportunities fostered by the moratorium. By 
the turn of the century SA Labor had come to see the virtues of uranium mining. But 
they steadfastly refused to consider the moral question that so troubled Dunstan, namely 
the exporter’s responsibility to help customers who struggled with the disposal question. 
Premier Rann mused on this matter by drawing an  analogy Dunstan would hardly have 
shared, ‘Suggestions in recent times that South Australia should take back the nuclear 
waste generated from the uranium we export to countries around the world is just not 
going to happen. This would be as silly as the state agreeing to take back every used bottle 





A number of nagging questions arise from any examination of this debate of the 1970s. 
The first concerns how the State missed the opportunity to add value to a raw mineral 
resource via the processes of enrichment. Having looked initially rather benignly at the 
prospect of developing a uranium enrichment plant in the State’s mid-north it transpired 
                                                
62 The Advertiser, 23 June, 1982. 
63 Marr, D, ‘Run-up in the shrinking State’, The National Times, 31 October – 6 November 1982. Rank and file 
members of the Party, Duncan told the National Times, ‘are spewing’ over the decision. For his part  Duncan said 
that while he remained opposed to the Bill, he accepted the decision of the party. According to the Journal of 
Politics and History chronicler, ‘the Liberals used the statement to argue that the election of an ALP government 
would jeopardize Roxby Downs, and the statement was used in anti-Labor 'independent' advertisements’, The 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, ‘Australian Political Chronicle – South Australia’,  vol. 29, no 3,[check] 
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64 SAPD, 22 March 1983, p. 495-506 and The Advertiser, 23 March, 1983 
65 SAPD (http://www2.parliament.sa.gov.au/hansard_data/2006/HA/WH300506.HA.htm) Tuesday 30 May 2006 and 
The Advertiser 31 May 2006. 
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that the Dunstan Government’s equivocation saw the State miss an opportunity  to value 
add. This must be seen as an unfortunate legacy of the period for, at the time, South 
Australia led other States but by the time Tonkin Indenture Bill passed the Parliament 
enthusiasm for enrichment had waned. Certainly, by the early 1980s it appeared the 
world had sufficient supplies of enriched uranium and today and the Australian company, 
Silex, has sold it patents to develop advanced laser enrichment technology to General 
Electric.66  The unfortunate irony is that nuclear power’s relatively carbon free capacity 
for power generation now finds the industry undergoing a renaissance and, in time, there 
will be a huge demand for enriched uranium.67  And, should Australia decide to develop 
nuclear power in coming decades, in all likelihood we will import fuel rods derived from 
our uranium exports. 
 
Dunstan’s  moratorium on all but exploration for uranium, supported by Bannon 
during his time as Opposition leader, rested heavily upon a moral assessment of the 
relationship between supplier and customer. That is, if customers could not solve the 
question of waste disposal it was deemed incumbent on uranium rich States to refuse 
supply. Today, we await the lifting of the three mines policy at the April 2007 ALP 
National Conference, a policy made redundant by the massive expansion of the Roxby 
Mine and the growing demand for nuclear power as a greenhouse friendly source of 
energy. How the Rann Labor Government reconciles the State ALP’s historic concern for 
customers incapacity to find suitable means for disposing of high grade nuclear wastes, 
with being one of the world’s largest uranium suppliers, is a question worth asking. 
 
South Australia offers some of the world’s most suitable geological formations for the 
long term storage of nuclear waste. It is interesting to ponder whether  recent strident 
opposition to the storage of low to intermediate range nuclear waste at a facility in the 
north of South Australia simply entrenches further the NIMBY phenomenon (Not-In-My-
Backyard). As South Australia weds itself further to the so-called ‘front end’ of the 
nuclear fuel cycle, the steadfast refusal to deal with issues arising at the so-called back 
end of the cycle, namely the disposal of high grade waste, remains debatable. While 
major and very expensive steps toward resolving waste disposal are taking place  in 
Sweden, most of our customers still struggle to find suitable answers. It is clear that if 
Australia was to host nuclear waste facilities for our customers (which now include 
China) a great service, indeed an exceptionally profitable and moral one, would be 
addressed. Equivocation on this matter over the next decade is likely to see Russia and 
possibly Argentina, filling the void. When it comes to dealing with matters nuclear, lost 
opportunities bedevil the legislators and, if the current temper of debate over the prospect 
of domestic nuclear power is any guide, it is difficult to see an end to the fear mongering   
                                                
66 During one of his heated exchanges with Tonkin, Dunstan explained that his oversees investigations indicated that 
‘We are now faced with the fact that uranium enrichment capacity in the world from 1985 will be enormous…The 
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situation in South Australia’. SAPD 6 February 1979, p. 2,362. Notwithstanding Dunstan’s summation when in 
Government Premier Tonkin continued pursuit of an enrichment plant having interested British consortium, Urenco-
Centec, in developing a site at Port Pirie or Whyalla, see SAPD 6 August 1980, p. 94-95 and The Advertiser 7 
August 1980. 
67 Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006, p 40. 
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that accompanies most anti-nuclear arguments. They foster the myopic disposition of 
NIMBYism and, when articulated by leaders who support uranium exports, a certain 
absurdity transpires. The populism of the anti-nuclear case, at this point in our history,  is 
unlikely to see an Opposition crave this as an issue with which to challenge the 
incumbent, even if it bespeaks of logical and moral consistency. 
 
